Federal Register :: Hazardous Materials; Transportation of Lithium Batteries

Lithium batteries, regardless of their size (i.e., small, medium and large), are hazardous materials and are subject to applicable requirements in the HMR. FEDCO states that, including new batteries in active design, it has about twenty 1- and 2-cell primary lithium batteries and 13 new lithium-ion packs containing from 2 to 12 cylindrical cells. FEDCO estimates the cost of having an independent testing facility, such as Underwriters Laboratories, perform the proposed tests would be about $20,000 per battery design.

Cargo containers are designed to only support 1 psi because they need to be suitable for depressurization. A more robust cargo compartment would be incompatible with the need for a depressurized environment. (1) PHMSA has not shown that the FAA fire testing of primary lithium batteries and cells represents realistic conditions that could be encountered in air transportation and pose an unreasonable risk to the traveling public. We agree with commenters who request an appropriate transition period for lithium battery manufacturers to test lithium battery designs that are currently on the market. Therefore, in this final rule, we are adopting a two-year compliance date for the testing of small lithium batteries and cells.

A. Overview of Lithium Battery Risks

The increasing manifestation of these risks, inside and outside of transportation, drives the need for stricter safety standards. Once used primarily in industrial and military applications, lithium batteries are now found in a variety of popular consumer items, including cameras, laptop computers, and mobile telephones. The numbers, types, and sizes of lithium batteries moving in transportation have grown steadily in recent years with the increasing popularity of these and other portable devices and the corresponding proliferation of battery designs, manufacturers, and applications. Six different types of Li-ion battery cells, type A-F, and one Li-ion battery pack, type G, were tested as seen in Table1. The number of cells used in each test was varied in order to achieve similar electrical energy capacity per test. The batteries were placed on wire gratings just above a 16 kW propane burner.

• There is a natural delay time between the FTIR and the heat release measurement.
• One potential problem regarding the use of water mist is that the addition of water may, in principle, increase the rate of formation of HF, see Eqs (2) and (3).
• In addition, you may submit comments specifically related to the information collection burden to the PHMSA Desk Officer, OMB, at fax number 202–395–6974.

(2) The FAA test results do not provide a rational basis for the IFR, particularly when compared with other FAA cargo compartment fire tests. Total amount of measured fluoride, F-, for type A, for 0–100% SOC with intermediate steps of 25%. The amount of F- from the FTIR is calculated from the measurement results for POF3 and HF, while the amount of fluoride from gas-washing bottles and primary filter analyses is measured as water soluble fluoride. Results for a test with 5 type A cells at 0% SOC showing HF and POF3, HRR and average surface temperature of the battery cells. (2) Incorporate a safety venting device or otherwise be designed in a manner that will preclude a violent rupture under conditions normally incident to transportation.

In fire tests there are always natural variations, however comparing the tests with 100% SOC, in Fig. 6a is delayed due to that it included an application of water mist, as discussed above. Although the appearance of the HRR plots of the four tests differs in Fig. Repetition 2 and 3 were performed in the third test period, without secondary FTIR filter, and therefore Repetition 2 occurs earlier while Repetition 3 is delayed due to the applied water mist, as discussed above.

Code/Special Provisions

Due to the high velocity of the release and thus the short reaction time, combustion reactions might be incomplete and less reaction products might be produced. In the test involving type G the cylindrical cells were layered horizontally, thus having a different venting direction and possibly increased wall losses, which combined with a very energetic response, might suggest why HF was detected only from the filter analysis and not detected by FTIR-analysis. The tested pouch cells of type B and C burned for longer time and with less intensity. The pouch cell of type F, however, burned faster, possibly due to its different electrode materials. The SOC influence on the HF release was less significant and the trend in Fig. 2a shows higher HF values for 0% than for 100% SOC, however with clear peaks at 50% SOC.

The sampling flow rate was checked before the start of each test using a Gilian Gilibrator-2 NIOSH Primary Standard Air Flow Calibrator gas flow meter. The procedure during a test was to continuously sample during the full test time. When the test was completed, the sampling tube was disconnected from the exhaust duct to allow rinsing of the tube with buffer solution, about 30 mL in the first gas-washing bottle, to collect any fluoride deposited on the inner walls of the tubing, in order to minimize losses in the tube. Since the tube was rinsed, heating of the tube was not necessary (any condensation in tube was collected anyhow).

Once penetration occurs, the ability of Halon to suppress a fire is reduced, and the fire can spread throughout the cargo compartment. Similarly, most cargo containers used in commercial shipments (roughly 90%) have only a single lining. Small numbers of burning primary lithium batteries can also raise the pressure pulse in a cargo container to the level at which the walls of the containers separate (1 psi). Separation of the cargo container raises the same concerns https://www.muranogrande.com/study-reveals-surprising-effects-of-testosterone-3/ as perforation of the containers. In the FAA tests, one brand of primary lithium batteries required only three burning batteries to raise the pressure pulse above 1 psi, while the two other brands required only four primary lithium batteries to reach the same psi. The pressure tests were added to the test protocol on the basis of initial test results; the FAA was surprised to see pressure changes in the tested compartment in the single-battery tests.

Out of the eight alternatives listed above, we rejected all but numbers 1, 3, 4, and 6. Our reasons for rejecting four of the eight alternatives hinge on safety concerns and the benefits of harmonization. The adoption of alternatives 1, 3, 4, and 6 will have little to no impact on safety and will provide a cumulative cost savings to the affected small businesses of only $100,000 per year. The following sections address the small business impacts of the measures adopted in this final rule, but separately proposed in Dockets HM–224C and HM–224E. This final rule addresses subject items (1), (2) and (3) described above and, accordingly, State, local, and Indian tribe requirements on these subjects that do not meet the “substantively the same” standard will be preempted.

These comments do not address the central fact that the fire suppression system in an aircraft cargo compartment is ineffective in suppressing a fire involving lithium batteries. The aircraft cargo compartment fire scenario of concern to PHMSA and FAA is not limited to a fire initiated by the primary lithium batteries, but includes a fire started by an outside source. Increasing packaging integrity and improved compliance do not address this significant concern. As we indicated in the preamble to the IFR, a primary lithium battery involved in a fire in a passenger aircraft cargo compartment could overcome the safety features of the cargo compartment.

The water mist was applied during two different periods of time, as marked in Fig. 5, adding a total of 851 g of water in the reaction zone, however, several other large sources of water were also present in the experiment, i.e. water production from the propane combustion and from humidity in the air. The water mist is cooling the fire and the top surface of the pouch cell was for some time partly covered with liquid water; this is the reason that the battery fire is delayed as seen in Fig. (1) Be of a type proven to meet the requirements of each test in the UN Manual of Tests and Criteria (IBR; see § 171.7 of this subchapter).

The consequence of a lithium battery-related fire depends largely on the transportation context. In weighing the costs and benefits of regulation, we consider the mode of transportation and impose the strictest standards in air transportation, particularly passenger service. Although most battery-related fires have caused only property damage or delays in ground transportation, even a small fire aboard an in-flight aircraft threatens catastrophic consequences. For purposes of this rulemaking, we use the term “primary lithium battery” to refer to a non-rechargeable battery and the term “secondary lithium battery” to refer to a rechargeable battery.